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1.

Timely (by
extension)

Resp was convicted after a trial in the USDC

(M.D. Ga.) (Owens) of five counts of possessing an un-

.

registered still, carrying on the business of a distiller
without giving bond and with intent to defraud the government
of whiskey tax, possession of 175 gallons of whiskey upon
which no tax es had been paid, and conspiracy to defraud the
United State s of tax revenues, violations of 18 U.S.C.
§

I

371 and 26 U.S.C. § 5601.

He was given concurrent prison
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terms of three years.

CA 5 reversed on the ground that

resp's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the admission
of evidence obtained by defective subpoenas directed to two

-

banks.
latter by a

impson, Brown, Bell, Ainsworth, Dyer,

Roney, Gee,

The SG petitions for cert contending

that resp did not have standing to raise Fourth Amendment objections to the subpoenas, that the subpoenas were not defective
and violative of the Fourth Amendment, and that, if there was such
a violation, there was no prejudice to resp requiring reversal of
his conviction.
2.

FACTS:

Agents of the Federal Alcohol, Tobacco &

Firearms Unit presented to the presidents of two banks in Georgia
grand jury subpoenas duces tecum requiring that they appear in
'=-

,....______........._......

t:wz~

the USDC at 9:00 a.m. on January 24, 1973, and that they produce

---

"a.JJ: records of accounts, i.~., savings, checking, loan or
_... ......
.,.......__
otherwise, in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller, 3859 Mathis Street,
Macon, Ga. and/or Mitch Miller, Associates, 100 Executive Terrace, Warner Robins, Ga., from October 1, 1972, through the
present date."

Resp was not given notice of these subpoenas.

When the banks supplied the requested materials to the
agents, the presidents were told that they would not have to
appear at the District Court for the January 24 and grand jury
session.

The grand jury did not meet until February 12, 1973.

~~-~---------~------------------~
The agents had reviewed
the bank records and made copies of
some which were introduced by the prosecution at trial.

They
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!

were used to help establish at least three of the overt
acts cha r ged against res p in furtherance of the conspiracy.

The presidents of the banks indicated that the microfilm
copies of the records which were shown to the agents were
kept in compliance with the Treasury and Banking regulations
issued
\

un ~ r t~e

Bank Secrec y_ Act.

The DC denied resp's

motion to suppress the copies of the records.
CA 5 reversed.

It noted that this Court in upholding

the Bank Secrecy Act in California Bankers Association v.
Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), had observed that depositors had
adequa te protection from improper governmental access to the

.

records which the banks were required to keep because " access
to the records is to be controlled by existing legal process. "
Id., at 52.

In this case, the government had not complied with

that legal process:
_.,.-..

rl

" Surely a purported grand jury subpoena,

-

issued not by the court or by the grand jury, but by the United
States Attorney's office, for a date when no grand jury was in
session, and which in effect compelled broad disclosure of
Miller's financial records to the government, does not constitute

-Petn. Appx., at 14a-15a (footnote omitted).

sufficient 'legal process ' within the meaning of the majority
..........

opinion o"

~

United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), applied:
('1 0

Boyd v.

" The government

may not cavalierly circumvent Boyd's precious protection by first
requiring a third party bank to copy all of its depositors '
personal che cks and then, with an improper invocation of legal
process, calling upon the bank to allow inspection and reproduction of those copies. "

It was an insufficient answer to point

- 4 to the willing cooperation of the l:smks,

The legal process

was designed to protect the depositors as well as the banks.
Judge Simpson, in dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en bane, stressed first that the panel had made
radical new

s~~~in~

law without discussion.

It appeared that

the panel had viewed resp as having both an ownership interest
in the records and a cognizable privacy interest.

Prior to

the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act, a depositor had not had a

______ ______

_,_
~
recognized
standing
to challenge IRS subpoenas of bank records

pertaining to his banking transactions.
quire a change in that law.

The Act did notre-

Indeed it would be anomalous to give

a depositor greater rights as a result of a statute requiring the
This issue was reserved for later

~ ~
~

lfA,f!fh
bNL· wa

r~~~~~

in good faith for the grand jury session, there

J~
was not

~ .~

.,do .~ .• : v
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Af

h'lng wrong ln requlrlng pro ductlon prlor tote
h sesslon .
I

I

O

O

C

~

would conserve the grand jury's time and enable preparation

that session.

See United States v. Morton Salt, 216 F. Supp.

(D. Minn. 1962), aff ' d summarily, 382 U.S . 44 (1965).

~

£

If

there is a question about the good faith of the prosecution, then

f.wu bt .tierctDt~here should be a remand for a hearing on that issue.
~ 1)A~ oJ,.·~ . . ~--

10

C

·~b~

Even if

process were defective, the defect is not such to require

ON>.~:~ reversal.
~ jw~ ~ Stutl. -lo l.t,.J ..Jo pnNih ~-~ pou.d.AL ~ .~.
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3.

CONTENTION S:
a.

The SG's contentions follow the points

made by Judge Simpson's dissent to the denial of rehearing
en bane.
(1)

The SG contends that the CA panel erred

in assuming that resp had standing to challenge the subpoenas on Fourth Amendment grounds.

Several courts had held

that there was no such standing to attack IRS subpoenas.
petn, at 9 n. 8.

See

The only protected Fourth Amendment interest

belongs to the bank.

The depositor has no reasonable expectation

~

of freedom from governmental inspection of the records.

Checks

~
-~----------~-----~---~
and similar
documents are knowingly
exposed to the public.

If

it is desirable anyway to restrict governmental access to such
bank records, the arguments should be addressed to Congress.
The enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act did not change the law of
standing in this area.

The banks continue to pay for the copying

and storing of records.

Indeed, depositors have less reason to

think that the records will be private.

The Act itself requires

the maintenance of records having a high utility "in criminal,
tax, or regulatory investigations . • • ," 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b)(2),
and thus it is doubtful that Congress intended to expand the
standing of depositors to challenge governmental access to the
records.
(2)

Even if resp had standing, there was nothing

unlawful about the subpoenas.

They were issued in accordance

with Rules 17(a) and 17(c), FoR. Crim. Proc.

...

The government
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attorney should be able to review the material prior to
the grand jury session so that the session can be conducted
in an orderly fashion.

Much time will be consumed if the

grand jury itself has to issue the subpoena, and it has to
be returned on a day when the grand jury is in session.
Requiring court approval of such subpoenas would waste judicial
resources.

The subpoena can be challenged prior to compliance

in a motion to quash or in a show-cause hearing.

There may be

some abuse, but that abuse can be handled by the courts.
Compare United States v. Bisceglia, ___ U.S.
was no basis for an inference of abuse here.

(1975).

There

There was a

specific ongoing investigation; the records were identified with
some particularity.

Indeed the grand jury can issue subpoenas

on the suspicion that the law is being violated.
( 3)

Even if the subpoenas were defective under

the Fourth Amendment, it does not follow that retrial was the
remedy.

Since the records could presumably be reacquired by

validly issued trial subpeonas, they could be reintroduced by an
independent source.

The SG, however, points out that the CA did

not indicate whether the taint it had found could be eliminated
in this way.

The question should be answered now prior to re-

trial.
b.

Resp answers that under State law the banks had

limited interests in the checks.
to the depositor.

They were customarily returned

The facts indicate that the subpoenas were

being used for a general search of documents in the hope of

..

,.

- 7 finding something of use in a criminal prosecution.

The

search was too broad and hence violated the Fourth Amendment.
See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1923).

..

~

The depositor does have a reasonable expectation of privacy

.:t ~~ in

presenting personal checks.

The expectation is that the

~~+~.L~heck will be used for the limited purpose of negotiation and

~~ ~~)lhen
?ri~~

returned to him for his personal record.

United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

~ rt~~~ ithout
bM+Jt. the

Wt~ M~

"---'

Cuu.JhiJ
~

~~

io

Here access was obtained

judicial scrutiny or notice to resp.

The facts show

potential for abuse through subpoenaing records for a grand

~~~~-u...u
.
~A.W..IJLU ~] Jury,

,

Compare Katz v .

b ut Wlt
. h out ever presentlng
.
. 1 s to t h e gran d
t h e materla

jury or making a return in court.

4.

DISCUSS.ION:

The CA 5 panel opinion does not discuss

the standing question and it cites no authorities for its conclusion that the subpoenas were unlawful.

Its opinion smacks of

a conclusion that the prosecution was in bad faith and was using
the grand jury as a facade, but it makes no findings of that sort
nor cites any made by the DC .

~

and remand for reconsideration in light of the latter.

Tnat would call at least for further discussion of the Fourth

~~~ ~mendment
~ ..0
~ O+o
~

O.~Offllt.
~

h

Perhaps the best disposition of

the case wouid be to hold it for Peltier, No. 73-2000, and then

-n.•~
~C).JJ. . ~~
~ f~~ ate
~Ki~~

!I

~nown

violation by the CA -- if the prosecution should have

that the subpoenas were unlawful -- although the fact that

':-'~'·)
• ~tCN\ - - - - - - - - - - -

'

1/
-The SG does observe that " [t]he record does not reveal whether
any of the bank records were presented to the grand jury. " Petn.,
at 6 n. 6.

- 8 -

?

I.

d~

• >

~(r$~d_

~~......~

California Bankers case would make such a conclusion highly

re..f4::ttldoubtful.

o-tll r

""JP "'"'"""
~:t
~

A.J.l

the standing question was explicitly left open here in the

See also Morton Salt, supra, 216, F. Supp. , at 25 7.

The CA would probably be forced to remand to the DC for an
evidentiary hearing on the good faith point.

A factor militating

in favor of immediate consideration on the merits here would be
the possibility that the CA decision has called into question
)

a widespread prosecution practice.

The standing issue clearly

warrants answering, but the question remains whether it need be
reached in this case.
There is a response .
5 / 27 / 75
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Supplemental List
No. 74-1179
UNITED STATES
Resp' s Motion for
. Appointment of
Counsel

v.
MILLER

On June 9, the Court granted cert to CA 5 in this case to
consider a 4th Amendment issue involving subpoenas served on resp's
banks.

The Court also granted resp's motion to proceed IFF.
Resp moves that D. J;;.. Rampey, Jr., Esquire, of Warner Robins,

-

Goergia, be appointed to represent him before this Court.

He notes that

Mr. Rampey was appointed by CA 5 under the Criminal Justice Act for
the purpose of responding to the Government's petition .:'or cert .

..
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Mr. Rampey is a member of the Bar of this Court.
There is no response.
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BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM

TO:

Justice Powell

FROM:

Carl Schenker

No. 74-1179

DATE:

January 12, 1976

United States v. Miller

I recommend reversal.
The parties appear to agree that the CA 5 panel
held that the alleged defects in the subpoena
violated
petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights. 1
Addressing the case
2

on that premise,

I think that the SG is correct that petitioner

has no Fourth Amendment rights in this context, so that the
subpoena cannot be challenged on that ground.

that a rather
suggests to me that

opinion could be read in another way, as
~

2.

The most useful analogy is to the "bugged informant"
cases (~·~·,United States v. White, 401 U.S.~.)

There

the Court has held that when one exposes his affairs to another,

-

he runs the risk that the other is a government informant who

..

will "rat" on him.

~..-.-

He further runs the risk that the informant

will "rat" very accurately
for sound).

"-"'_,

(i.~.,

that the informant is bugged

People dealing with banks run the same risks.

They

expose their affairs to the scrutiny of bank employees, thereby
foregoing any significant privacy expectation in those affairs.
Bank employees could testify to those transactions, if they could
remember them.

The bank can also choose to record the transactions

to help bolster the memory of the employees.
the

~tb

I do not view

Amendment privacy anal¥sis as being changed significantly

~

~-

....,;;;)

by the fact that the bank is required to keep records by the Act.
The "recruiting" of the bank into investigative purposes is no
different than the hiring of an informant.

In fact, it is less

offensive in many respects because it is known that the bank
plays this roll.

(Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(Warren, C.J., dissenting.) 3

Y

3. I know from your brief concurring statement in
California Bankers Assn. that you have some doubts about the propriety
of broadly sweeping reporting requirements under the Bank Secrecy
Act. I do not view your concerns as inconsist ent ··with my analysis.
When the recordkeeping requirements are used through legal process
in a criminal case, much different concerns are implicated than with
blanket reporting unrelated to a criminal case. I think your concurring
statement reflects this distinction.

3.

This is all that needs to be said to dispose of
this case as the parties view it.

Thus, reversal is called for.

Let me advance, however, some further thoughts on
the case.

I think that the CA 5 panel opinion is susceptible to

another interpretation.
(1)

The opinion could be read to say:

There are Fourth Amendment overtones to the Act's record-

keeping requirements.

(2)

Despite those overtones, the

requirements are constitutional (California Bankers

Ass'n.~and

the Government may by proper process compel the production of the
required records.

(3) But, in doing so, the Government's

exercise of process must be valid.

Here it was invalid because

of the various alleged defects in the subpoena.
In short, this reading of the opinion is that the
CA 5 panel found no Fourth Amendment violation but simply required
that process be used in accord with procedural niceties.

The

trouble with this approach, however, is again the matter of
"standing."

Ordinarily defects in process should be challenged

in a motion to quash, which allows their correction.

Since the

defects will often be correctable, a complaining witness should
not be able to disclose and then get suppression, as CA 5 ordered
here.

The "witness" here having disclosed without objection to

the subpoena, suppression on behalf of the customer seems
inappropriate.

.

The problem, however, is that the "real party in

wk.o

~

N>

1\.C){,.e.e, J

interest" is the petitioner,land the bank has little reason to
resist defective subpoenas.

4.
This problem, though, is not unique to this area.
It arises also in the context of administrative summons to third
parties with regard to, for example, an individual's tax
liability.

And the Court has had occasion to examine the third

party issue in that context.
States, 400 U.S.

lLJ_.

See,~-~·'

Donaldson v. United

There the Court held that under Fed.

R. Civil Pro. 24(a)(2) an interested taxpayer could intervene
in a suit to enforce an administrative subpoena to show that
the subpoena power was being abused.
I think the same guarantee should be available to
those situated as was petitioner.

Although this is a grand

jury subpoena rather than an administrative surrmons, the enforcement
procedures appear to be the same.

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings

(Schofield I), 486 F. 2d 85, 90 ("There is no indication that
Congress intended the role of the court to be different in"
administrative summons enforcement cases than in grand jury
subpoena enforcement cases.)

Thus, I think that under Fed. R.

Civil Pro. 24(a)(2), or the inherent rule making authority of
this Court, those situated as is petitioner should be able to
intervene in an enforcement suit.

In that suit, such an

individual could contest the validity of the summons.
Of course, recognizing such an intervention right
does not get one very far if the bank voluntarily turns over the
subpoenaed matter.

But at present I can see no basis on

which the Court could require notice of the subpoena directly to

5.

the bank customer and the initiation by the customer of a
direct action to quash.

Banks, however, might agree contractually

to oppose subpoenas in order to allow their customers to
intervene.

Congress might also allow for a direct action.
In sum, as we have the case, I would reverse.
Carl.

Bren11an , ~·=
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-1179

United States, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of ApMitchell Miller.
peals for the Fifth Circuit.
[April -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmton of the
Court.
Respondent was convicted of possessing an unregistered still, carrying on the business of a distiller without
giving bond and with intent to defraud the Government
of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of whiskey upon
which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to defraud
the United States of tax revenues. 18 U. S. C. § 371;
26 U. S. C. § 5179, 5205, 5601 et seq. Prior to trial
respondent moved to suppress copies of checks and other
bank records obtained by means of allegedly defective
subpoenas duces tecum served upon two banks at which
he had accounts. The records had been maintained by
the banks in compliance with the requirements of the
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U. S. C. § 1829 (d).
The District Court overruled respondent's motion to
suppress and the evidence was admitted. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground
that a depositor's Fourth Amendment rights are violated
when bank records maintained pursuant to the Bank
Secrecy Act are obtained by means of a defective subpoena. It held that any evidence so obtained must be
suppressed, Since we find that respondent had no protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the subpoenaed
documents, we reverse; the decision below.

74-1179-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. MILLER

I
On December 18, 1972, in response to an informant's
tip, a deputy sheriff from Houston County, Ga., stopped
a van-type truck occupied by two of respondent's alleged
coconspirators.
The truck contained distillery apparatus and raw material. On January 9, 1973, a fire broke
out in a Kathleen, Ga., warehouse rented to respondent.
During the blaze firemen and sheriff department officials
discovered a 7,500 gallon-capacity distillery, 175 gallons
of nontax-paid whiskey, and related paraphernalia.
Two weeks later agents from the Treasury Department's Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Unit presented
grand jury subpoenas issued in blank by the clerk of the
District Court, and completed by the United States
Attorney's office, to the presidents of the Citizens &
Southern Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank of
Byron, where respondent maintained accounts. The
subpoenas required the two presidents to appear on
January 23, 1973, and to produce
"all records of accounts, i. e., savings, checking,
loan or otherwise, in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller
[respondent], 3859 Mathis Street, Macon, Ga.
and/ or Mitch Miller Associates, 100 Executive
Terrace, Warner Robins, Ga., from October 1, 1972,
through the present date {January 22, 1973, in the
case of the Bank of Byron, and January 23, 1973,
in the case of the Citizens & Southern Bank of
Warner Robins] ."
The banks did not advise respondent that the subpoena.s
had been served but ordered their employees to make the
records available and to provide copies of any documents
the agents desired. At the Bank of Byron, an agent was·
shown microfilm copies of the relevant checks and provided with copies of one deposit slip and two checks.
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At the Citizens & Southern Bank microfilm records also
were shown to the agent, and he was given copies of
the records of respondent's account during the applicable
period. These included all checks, deposit slips, two
financial statements and three monthly statements, The
bank presidents were then told that it would not be
necessary to appear in person before the grand jury.
The grand jury met on February 12, 1973, 19 days
after the return date on the subpoenas. Respondent and
four others were indicted. The overt acts alleged to
have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy
included three financial transactions-the rental by respondent of the van-type truck, the purchase by respondent of radio equipment, and the purchase by respondent
of a quantity of sheet metal and metal pipe. The record
does not indicate whether any of the bank records were
in fact presented to the grand jury. They were used in
the investigation and provided "one or two" investigatory leads. Copies of the checks also were introduced
at trial to establish the overt acts described above.
In his motion to suppress, denied by the District Court,
respondent contended that the bank documents were illegally seized. It was urged that the subpoenas were
defective because they were issued by the U. S. Attorney
rather than a court, no return was made to a court, and
the subpoenas were returnable on a date when the grand
jury was not in session. The Court of Appeals reversed.
500 F. 2d 751 (1974). Citing the prohibition in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 622 (1886), against "compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him," the court held that
the government had improperly circumvented Boyd's
protections of respondent's Fourth Amendment right
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by "first
requiring a third party bank to copy all of its depositors'
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personal checks and then, with an improper invocation of
legal process, calling upon the bank to allow inspection
and reproduction of those copies." 500 F. 2d, at 757. The
court acknowledged that the recordkeeping requirements
of the Bank Secrecy Act had been held to be constitutional on their face in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
416 U. S. 21 (1974), but noted that access to the records
was to be controlled by "existing legal process." I d., at
52. The subpoenas issued here were found not to constitute adequate "legal process." The fact that the bank
officers cooperated voluntarily was found to be irrelevant,
for "he whose rights are threatened by the improper disclosure here was a bank depositor, not a bank official."
500 F .. 2d, at 756.
The Government contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in three respects : (i) in finding that respondent had
standing to challenge the validity of the subpoenas duces
tecum through his motion to suppress; (ii) in holding
that the subpoenas were defective; and (iii) in determining that suppression of the evidence obtained was
the appropriate remedy if a constitutional violation did
take place.
We find that there was no intrusion into any area in
which respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment
interest and that the District Court therefore correctly
denied respondent's motion to suppress. Because we
rev:erse the decision of the Court of Appeals on that
ground alone, we do not reach the Government's latter
two contentions.
II
In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 301-302
(1966), the Court said that "no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment" is implicated by governmental investigative activities unless there is an intrusion into a zone of privacy, into "the security a man
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relies upon when he places himself or his property within
a constitutionally protected area." The Court of Ap~
peals, as noted above, assumed that respondent had the
necessary Fourth Amendment interest, pointing to the
language in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S., at 622,
which describes that Amendment's protection against
the "compulsory production of a man's private papers." :1
We think that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the
subpoenaed documents to fall within a protected zone of
privacy.
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not
respondent's "private papers." Unlike the claimant in
Boyd, respondent can assert neither ownership nor possession. Instead, these are the business records of the
banks. As we said in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
416 U. S., at 48-49, "[b]anks are ... not ... neutrals in
transactions involving negotiable instruments, but parties
to the instruments with a substantial stake in their continued availability and acceptance." The records of respondent's accounts, like "all of the records [which are
required to be kept by the Bank Secrecy Act,] pertain to
transactions to which the bank was itself a party." /d.,
at 52.
Respondent argues, however, that the Bank Secrecy
Act introduces a factor that makes the subpoena in this
case the functional equivalent of a search and seizure of
the depositor's "private papers." We have held, in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 54, that the
mere maintenance of records pursuant to the requirements of the Act "invade[s] no Fourth Amendment right
of any depositor." But respondent contends that the
1 The Fourth Amendment implications of Boyd as it applies to
subpoenas duces tecum have been undercut by more recent cases.
Fisher v. United States, U . S. (1976), slip op., at 15, See
infra, at - -· - .
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combination of the recordkeeping requirements of the
Act and the issuance of a subpoena 2 to obtain those
records permits the Government to circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amendment by allowing it to
obtain a depositor's private records without complying
with the legal requirements that would be applicable had
it proceeded against him directly. 3 Therefore, we must
address the question whether the compulsion embodied in
the Bank Secrecy Act as exercised in this case creates
a Fourth Amendment interest in the depositor where
none existed before. This question was expressly reserved in California Bankers Assn., supra, at 53-54 &
n. 24.
Respondent urges that he has a Fourth Amendment
ihterest in the records kept by the banks because they
are merely copies of personal records that were made
available to the banks for a limited purpose and in
which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. He
relies on this Court's statement in Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, 353 (1967), quoting Warden v. Hayden,
387 U. S. 304 (1967), that "we have ... departed from
the narrow view" · that "property interests control the
right of the Government to search and· seize," and that
a "search and seizure" become unreasonable when the
~ Respondent appears to contend that a depositor's Fourth
Amendment interest comes into play only when a defective subpoena is used to obtain records kept pursuant to the Act. We see
no reason why the existence of a Fourth Amendment interest turns
on whether the subpoena is defective. Therefore, we do not limit
our consideration to the situ::ttion in which there is an alleged defect
in the subpoena served on the bank.
8 It is not clear whether respondent refers to attempts to obtain
private documents through a subpoena issued directly to the dep,ositor or through a search pursuant to a warrant. The question
whether personal business records may be seized pursuant to a
valid warrant is before this Court in No . 74-1646, Andreson v~

Maryland..
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Government's activities violate "the privacy upon which
[a person] justifiably relie[s] ." But in Katz the Court
also stressed that " [ w] hat a person knowingly exposes
to the public . .. is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection." ld., at 351. We must examine the nature
of the particular documents sought to be protected in
order to determine whether there is a legitimate "expectation of privacy" concerning their contents. See
Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 335 (1973) .
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks
and deposit slips, rather than to the microfilm copies
actually viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena,
we perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in
their contents. The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in
commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained,
including financial statements and deposit slips, contain
only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business. The lack of any legitimate expectation of
privacy concerning the information kept in bank records
was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records
to be maintained because they "have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations
or proceedings. " 12 U. S. C. § 1829 (a) (2). Cf. Couch v.
United States, supra, at 335.
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the government. United States v. White,
401 U. S. 745, 751- 752 (1971). This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption
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that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed:
United States v. White, supra, at 752; Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U. S., at 302; Lopez v. United States, 373.
u. s. 427 (1963) .
This analysis is not changed by the mandate of the
Bank Secrecy Act that records of depositors' transactions
be maintained by banks. In California Bankers Assn. v:
Shultz, supra, at 52-53, we rejected the contention that
banks, when keeping records of their depositors' transactions pursuant to the Act, are acting solely as agents
of the government. But, even if the banks could be
said to have been acting solely as government agents iq
transcribing the necessary information and complying
without protest with the requirements of the subpoenas:
there would be no intrusion upon the depositors' Fourt~
,Amendment rights. See Osborn v. United States, ~Sq
U. S. 323 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206
(1966) . This may be an unattractive role for nationally
regulated banks to play, but that is a question for the
legislature, rather than a matter of constitutional right.
In enacting the Bank Secrecy Act~ Congress has indicated its decision that the role is proper.
~

III
, Since no Fourth Amendment interests of the depositot
are implicated here, this case is governed by the general
rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party
to obtain the records of that party does not violaM
the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution
~~ contemplated a~ the time the subpoena is issued.
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S., at 53 ;
l)onaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517, 537 (1971)
,\Douglas, J ., concurring). Under th~se principles, it
WttS firmly settledl before the passage of the Bank
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Secrecy Act, that an Internal Revenue Service summons
directed to a third-party bank does not violate the
Fourth Amendment rights of a depositor under investigation. See First National Bank v. United States, 267 U.S.
576 (1925), aff'g, 295 F. 142 (SD Ala. 1924). See also
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 53; Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S., at 522.
Many banks traditionally kept permanent records of
their depositors' accounts, although not all banks did so
and the practice was declining in recent years. By requiring that such records be kept by all banks, the Bank
Secrecy Act is not a novel means designed to circumvent established Fourth Amendment rights. It is merely
an attempt to facilitate the use of a proper and longstanding law enforcement technique by insuring that
records are available when they are needed}
We hold that the District Court correctly denied respondent's motion to suppress, since he possessed no
Fourth Amendment interest that could be vindicated by
a challenge to the subpoenas.

IV
Respondent contends not only that the subpoenas
4

Petitioner does not contend that the subpoenas infringed upon
his First Amendment rights. There was no blanket reporting reU. S.
quirement of the sort we addressed in Buckley v. Valeo, (1976), slip op., at 54-69, nor any allegation of an improper
inquiry into protected associational activities of the sort presented
in Eastland v. Unit ed Serviceman's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975) .
We are not confronted with a situation in which the Government,
through "unreviewed executive discretion," has made a wide-ranging
inquiry that unnecessarily "touches upon intimate areas of an
individual's personal affairs." California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
supra, at 78-79 (POWELL, J ., concurring) . Here the Government
has exercised its powers through narrowly directed subpoenas duces
tecum subject to the legal restraints attendant to such process.
Soo Part IV, infra.
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duces tecum directed against the banks infringed his
Fourth Amendment rights, but that a subpoena issued
to a bank to obtain records maintained pursuant to the
Act is subject to more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the ordinary subpoena. In making
this assertion he relies on our statement in California.
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, that access to the records
maintained by banks under the Act was to be controlled
by "existing legal process."
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 208 (1946), the Court said that "the Fourth
[Amendment], if applicable [to subpoenas for the production of business records and papers], at the most
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be 'particularly
described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding
agency is authorized by law to make and the materials
specified are relevant."
See also United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1973). Respondent, citing
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S.
297 ( 1973), in which we discussed the application of
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to
domestic security surveillance through electronic eavesdropping, suggests that greater judicial scrutiny, equivalent to that required for a search warrant, is necessary when a subpoena is to be used to obtain bank
records of a depositor's account. But in California
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, we emphasized only that
access to the records was to be in accordance with ''existing legal process." There was no indication that a new
rule was to be devised, or that the traditional distinction
between a search warrant and a subpoena would not be
recognized.5
"A subpoena duces tecum issued to obtain records is subject to
no more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the
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fn any event, for the reasons stated above, we hold
that respondent lacks the requisite Fourth Amendmentinterest to challenge the validity of the subpoenas.

v
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The.
Court deferred decision on whether the trial court had
improperly overruled respondent's motion to suppress,
distillery apparatus and raw material seized from a rented
truck. We remand for· disposition of that issue.

So ordered,

ordinary subpoena. A search warrant, in contrast, is issuable only
pursuant to prior judicial approval and authorizes government officers to seize evidence without requiring enforcement through the
courts. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, g...10 (1973).
6 There is no occasion for us to address whether the subpoenas
complied with the requirements outlined in Walling. The banks
upon which they were served did not contest their validity.
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Respondent was convicted of possessing an unregistered still, carrying on the business of a distiller without
giving bond and with intent to defraud the Government
of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of whiskey upon
which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to defraud
the United States of tax revenues. 18 U. S. C. § 371;
26 U. S. C. § 5179, 5205, 5601 et seq. Prior to trial
respondent moved to suppress copies of checks and other
bank records obtained by means of allegedly defective
subpoenas duces tecum served upon two banks at which
he had accounts. The records had been maintained by
the banks in compliance with the requirements of the
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U. S. C. § 1829 (d) .
The District Court overruled respondent's motion to
suppress and the evidence was admitted. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground
that a depositor's Fourth Amendment rights are violated
when bank records maintained pursuant to the Bank
Secrecy Act are obtained by means of a defective subpoena. It held that any evidence so obtained must be
suppressed. Since we find that respondent had no protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the subpoenaed
documents, we reverse the decision below.
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I
On December 18, 1972, in response to an informant's
tip, a deputy sheriff from Houston County, Ga., stopped
a van-type truck occupied by two of respondent's alleged
coconspirators. The truck contained distillery appa•
ratus and raw material. On January 9, 1973, a fire broke
out in a Kathleen, Ga., warehouse rented to respondent.
During the blaze firemen and sheriff department officials
discovered a 7,500 gallon-capacity distillery, 175 gallons
of nontax-paid whiskey, and related paraphernalia.
Two weeks later agents from the Treasury Department's Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Unit presented
grand jury subpoenas issued in blank by the clerk of the·
District Court, and completed by the United States
Attorney's office, to the presidents of the Citizens &
Southern Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank of
Byron, where respondent maintained accounts. The·
subpoenas required the two presidents to appear on
January 23, 1973, and to produce
"all records of accounts, i. e., savings, checking,
loan or otherwise, in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller·
(respondent], 3859 Mathis Street, Macon, Ga.
and/ or Mitch Miller Associates, 100 Executive
Terrace, Warner Robins, Ga., from October 1, 1972;
through the present date [January 22, 1973, in the·
case of the Bank of Byron, and January 23, 1973,
in the case of the Citizens & Southern Bank of
Warner Robins] ."
The banks did not advise respondent that the subpoenas
had been served but ordered their employees to make the ·
records available and to provide copies of any documents·
the agents desired. At the Bank of Byron, an agent was·
shown microfilm copies of the relevant checks and pro~
v.id~d with copies of one deposit slip and two checks..
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At the Citizens & Southern Bank microfilm records also
were shown to the agent, and he was given copies of
the records of respondent's account during the applicable
period. These included all checks, deposit slips, two
flnanci.al statements and three monthly statements. The
bank presidents were then told that it would not be
necessary to appear in person before the grand jury.
The grand jury met on February 12, 1973, 19 days
after the return date on the subpoenas. Respondent and
four others were indicted. The overt acts alleged to
have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy
included three financial transactions-the rental by respondent of the van-type truck, the purchase by respondent of radio equipment, and the purchase by respondent
of a quantity of sheet metal and metal pipe. The record
does not indicate whether any of the bank records were
in fact presented to the grand jury. They were used in
the investigation and provided "one or two" investigatory leads. Copies of the checks also were introduced
at trial to establish the overt acts described above.
In his motion to suppress, denied by the District Court,
respondent contended that the bank documents were illegally seized. It was urged that the subpoenas were
defective because they were issued by the U. S. Attorney
rather than a court, no return was made to a court, and
the subpoenas were returnable on a date when the grand
jury was not in session. The Court of Appeals reversed.
500 F . 2d 751 (1974). Citing the prohibition in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 622 (1886), against "compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him," the court held that
the government had improperly circumvented Boyd's
protections of respondent's Fourth Amendment right
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by "first
requiring a third party bank to copy all of its depositors'
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personal checks and then, with an improper invocation of
legal process, calling upon the bank to allow inspection
and reproduction of those copies." 500 F. 2d, at 757. The
court acknowledged that the recordkeeping requirements
of the Bank Secrecy Act had been held to be constitutional on their face in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
416 U. S. 21 ( 1974), but noted that access to the records
was to be controlled by "existing legal process." I d., at
52. The subpoenas issued here were found not to constitute adequate "legal process." The fact that the bank
officers cooperated voluntarily was found to be irrelevant,
for "he whose rights are threatened by the improper disclosure here was a bank depositor, not a bank official."
500 F. 2d, at 756.
The Government contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in three respects : (i) in finding that respondent had
standing to challenge the validity of the subpoenas duces
tecum through his motion to suppress; (ii) in holding
that the subpoenas were defective; and (iii) in determining that suppression of the evidence obtained was
the appropriate remedy if a constitutional violation did
take place.
We find that there was no intrusion into any area in
which respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment
interest and that the District Court therefore correctly
demed respondent's motion to suppress. Because we
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on that
ground alone, we do not reach the Government's latter
two contentions,
II
In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 301-302
(1966), the Court said that "no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment" is implicated by governmental investigative activities unless there is an intrusion into a zone of privacy~ into "the security a man
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relies upon when he places himself or his property within
a constitutionally protected area." The Court of Ap·
peals, as noted above, assumed that respondent had the
necessary Fourth Amendment interest, pointing to the
language in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S., at 622,
which describes that Amendment's protection against
the "compulsory production of a man's private papers." 1
We think that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the
subpoenaed documents to fall within a protected zone of
privacy.
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not
respondent's "private papers." Unlike the claimant in
Boyd, respondent can assert neither ownership nor possession. Instead, these are the business records of the
banks. As we said in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
416 U. S., at 48-49, "[b]anks are ... not ... neutrals in
transactions involving negotiable instruments, but parties
to the instruments with a substantial stake in their continued availability and acceptance." The records of respondent's accounts, like "all of the records [which are
required to be kept by the Bank Secrecy Act,] pertain to
transactions to which the bank was itself a party." ld.,
at 52.
Respondent argues, however, that the Bank Secrecy
Act introduces a factor that makes the subpoena in this
case the functional equivalent of a search and seizure of
the depositor's "private papers." We have held, in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 54, that the
mere maintenance of records pursuant to the requirements of the Act "invade[s] no Fourth Amendment right
of any depositor." But respondent contends that the
1 The Fourth Amendment implications of Boyd as it applies to
subpoenas duces tecum have been undercut by more recent cases.
Fisher v. United States,- U. S. (1976), slip op., at 15, See
injro., at - --.-,
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combination of the recordkeeping requirements of the
Act and the issuance of a subpoena 2 to obtain those
records permits the Government to circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amendment by allowing it to
obtain a depositor's private records without complying
with the legal requirements that would be applicable had
it proceeded against him directly. 3 Therefore, we must
address the question whether the compulsion embodied in
the Bank Secrecy Act as exercised in this case creates
a Fourth Amendment interest in the depositor where
none existed before. This question was expressly reserved in California Bankers Assn., supra, at 53-54 &
n. 24.
Respondent urges that he has a Fourth Amendment
interest in the records kept by the banks because they
are merely copies of personal records that were made
available to the banks for a limited purpose and in
which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. He
relies on this Court's statement in Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, 353 (1967), quoting Warden v. Hayden,
387 U. S. 304 (1967), that "we have ... departed from
the narrow view" that "property interests control the
right of the Government to search and seize," and that
a "search and seizure" become unreasonable when the
1! Respondent
appears to contend that a depositor's Fourth
Amendment interest comes into play only when a defective subpoena is used to obtain records kept pursuant to the Act. We see
no reason why the existence of a Fourth Amendment interest turns
·on whether the subpoena is defective. Therefore, we do not limit
our consideration to the situ!l.tion in which there is an alleged defect
in the subpoena served on the bank.
3 It is not clear whether respondent refers to attempts to obtain
private documents through a subpoena issued directly to the depositor or through a search pursuant to a warrant. The question
whether personal business records may be seized pursuant to a
valid warrant is before this Court in No . 74-1646, Andreson v.
Maryland.
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Government's activities violate "the privacy upon which
[a person] justifiably relie[s] ." But in Katz the Court
also stressed that " [ w] hat a person knowingly exposes
to the public . .. is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection." Id., at 351. We must examine the nature
of the particular documents sought to be protected in
order to determine whether there is a legitimate "expectation of privacy" concerning their contents. See
Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 335 (1973).
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks
and deposit slips, rather than to the microfilm copies
actually viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena,
we perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in
their contents. The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in
commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained,
including financial statements and deposit slips, contain
only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business. The lack of any legitimate expectation of
privacy conc~rning the information kept in bank records
was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records
to be maintained because they "have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations
or proceedings." 12 U.S. C.§ 1829 (a) (2). Cf. Couch v.
United States, supra, at 335.
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the government. United States v. White,
401 U. S. 745, 751- 752 (1971). This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption
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that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
United States v. White, supra, at 752; Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U. S., at 302; Lopez v. United States, 373
u. s. 427 (1963) .
This analysis is not changed by the mandate of the
Bank Secrecy Act that records of depositors' transactions
be maintained by banks. In California Bankers Assn. v.
Shultz, supra, at 52-53, we rejected the contention that
banks, when keeping records of their depositors' transactions pursuant to the Act, are acting solely as agents
of the government. But, even if the banks could be
said to have been acting solely as government agents in
transcribing the necessary information and complying
without protest • with the requirements of the subpoenas,
there would be no intrusion upon the depositors' Fourth
Amendment rights. See Osborn v. United States, 385
U. S. 323 (1966) ; Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206
(1966) .

III
Since no Fourth Amendment interests of the depositor
are implicated here, this case is governed by the general
rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party
to obtain the records of that party does not violate
the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution
is contemplated at the time the subpoena is issued.
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S., at 53;
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517, 537 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring). Under these principles, it
was firmly settled, before the passage of the Bank
Secrecy Act, that an Internal Revenue Service summons
directed to a third-party bank does not violate the
1

Nor did the banks notify respondent, a neglect without !epl
oonsequences here, however unattractive it may be.
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Fourth Amendment rights of a depositor under investigation. See First National Bank v. United States, 267 U.S.
576 (1925), aff'g, 295 F. 142 (SD Ala. 1924). See also
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 53; Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S., at 522.
Many banks traditionally kept permanent records of
their depositors' accounts, although not all banks did so
and the practice was declining in recent years. By requiring that such records be kept by all banks, the Bank
Secrecy Act is not a novel means designed to circumvent established Fourth Amendment rights. It is merely
an attempt to facilitate the use of a proper and longstanding law enforcement technique by insuring that
records are available when they are needed. 5
We hold that the District Court correctly denied respondent's motion to suppress, since he possessed no
Fourth Amendment interest that could be vindicated by
a challenge to the subpoenas.

IV
Respondent contends not only that the subpoenas
duces tecum directed against the banks infringed his
PetitiOner does not contend that the subpoenas infringed upon
his First Amendment rights . There was no blanket reporting requirement of the sort we addressed in Buckley v. Valeo, U. S.
(1976), slip op., at 54-69, nor any allegation of an improper
inquiry into protected associational activities of the sort presented
in Eastland v. United Serviceman's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975).
We are not confronted with a situation in which the Government,
through "unreviewed executive discretion," has made a wide-ranging
inquiry that unnecessarily "touches upon intimate areas of an
individual's personal affairs." California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
supra, at 78-79 (PowELL, J., concurring). Here the Government
has exercised its powers through narrowly directed subpoenas duces
tecum subject to the legal restraints attendant to such process.
See Part IV, infra.
5
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Fourth Amendment rights, but that a subpoena issued
to a bank to obtain records maintained pursuant to the
Act is subject to more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the ordinary subpoena. In making
this assertion he relies on our statement in California
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, that access to the records
maintained by banks under the Act is to be controlled
by "existing legal process."
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 208 ( 1946), the Court said that "the Fourth
[Amendment], if applicable [to subpoenas for the production of business records and papers], at the most
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be 'particularly
described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding
agency is authorized by law to make and the materials
specified are relevant." See also United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 11-12 ( 1973). Respondent, citing
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S.
297 (1973), in which we discussed the application of
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to
domestic security surveillance through electronic eavesdropping, suggests that greater judicial scrutiny, equivalent to that required for a search warrant, is necessary when a subpoena is to be used to obtain bank
records of a depositor's account. But in California
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, we emphasized only that
access to the records was to be in accordance with "existing legal process." There was no indication that a new
rule was to be devised, or that the traditional distinction
between a search warrant and a subpoena would not be
recognized.6
6 A subpoena duces tecum issued to obtain records is subject to
no more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the
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In any event, for the reasons stated above, we hold
that· respondent lacks the requisite Fourth Amendment
interest to challenge the validity of the subpoenas.7

v
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The:
court deferred decision on whether the trial court had
improperly overruled respondent's motion to suppress.
distillery apparatus and raw material seized from a rented
truck. We remand for disposition of that issue.
So ordered..

ordinary subpoena. A search warrant , in contrast, is issuable only
pursuant to prior judicial approval and authorizes government officers to seize evidence without requiring enforcement t hrough the
courts. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1973) .
'~ There is no occasion for us to address whether the subpoenas
complied with t he requirements outlined in Walling. The banks:
upon which they were served did not contest their validity.
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MR. JusTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the
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Respondent 'Yas convicted of possessing an unregistered still, carrymg on the business of a distiller without
giving bond and with intent to defraud the Government
of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of whiskey upon
which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to defraud
the United States of tax revenues. 26 U. S. C. § 5179,
5205, 5601 et seq. ; 18 U. S. C. § 371. Prior to trial
respondent moved to suppress copies of checks and other·
bank records obtained by means of allegedly defective
subpoenas duces tecum served upon two banks at which
he had accounts. The records had been maintained by
the banks in compliance with the requirements of the
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U. S. C. § 1829b (d).
The District Court overruled respondent's motion to
suppress and the evidence was admitted. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground
that a depositor's Fourth Amendment rights are violated
when bank records maintained pursuant to the Bank
Secrecy Act are obta1ned by means of a defective subpoena. It held that any evidence so obtained must be
suppressed. Since we find that respondent had no protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the subpoenaed
documents, we reverse the decision below.
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I
On December 18, 1972, in response to an informanes
tip, a deputy sheriff from Houston County, Ga., stopped
8. van-type truck occupied by two of respondent's alleged
co-conspirators. The truck contained distillery apparatus and raw material. On January 9, 1973, a fire broke
out in a Kathleen~ Ga., warehouse rented to respondent.
During the blaze firemen and sheriff department officials
· discovered a 7,500 gallon-capacity distillery, 175 gallons
· of nontax-paid. whiskey, and related paraphernalia.
Two weeks later agents from the Treasury Department's Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Unit presented
grand jury subpoenas issued in blank by the clerk of the·
District Court, and completed by the United States
Attorney's office, to the presidents of the Citizens &
Southern N ationa1 Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank
of Byron, where respondent maintained accounts. The·
subpoenas required the two presidents to appear on
January 24, 1973, and to produce.
"all records of accounts, i. e., savings, checking,
loan or otherwise, in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller
'[respondent], 3859 Mathis Street, Macon, Ga.
·and/or Mitch Miller Associates, 100 Executive
'Terrace, Warner Robins, Ga., from October 1, 1972,
through the present date [January 22, 1973, in the·
·Case of the Bank of Byron, and January 23, 1973,
in the case of the Citizens & Southern National Bank
of Warner Robins] ."
'The banks did not advise respondent that the subpoenas·
bad been served but ordered their employees to make the·
records available and to provide copies of any documents:
the agents desired. At the Bank of Byron, an agent was:
shown microfilm records of the relevant account and provided with copies of one deposit slip and one or two check~-
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At· the Citizens & Southern National Bank microfilm records also were shown to the agent, .and he was given copies
of the records of respondent's account during the applicable period. These included all checks, deposit slips, two
financial statements and three monthly statements. The
bank presidents were then told that it would not be
necessary to appear in person before the grand jury.
The grand jury met on February 12, 1973, 19 day8
after the return date on the subpoenas. Respondent and
four others were indicted. The overt acts alleged to
have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy
included three financial transactions-the rental by re•
spondent of the van-type truck, the purchase by respond•
ent of radio equipment, and the purchase by respondent
of a quantity of sheet metal and metal pipe. The record
does not indicate whether any of the bank records were
in fact presented to the grand jury. They were used in
the investigation and provided "one or two" investiga..
tory leads. Copies of the checks also were introduced
at trial to establish the overt acts described above.
In his motion to suppress, denied by the District Court,
respondent contended that the bank documents were illegally seized. It was urged that the subpoenas were·
defective because they were issued by the U. S. Attorney
rather than a court, no return was made to a court, -a nd
the subpoenas were returnable on a date when the g-rand·
jury was not in session. The Court of Appeals reversed.
500 F . 2d 751 (1974) . Citing the prohibition in Boyd ·V.
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 622 (1886), against "compulsory production of a man's private papers to estab-·
lish a criminal charge against him," the court held that
the government had improperly circumvented Boyd's·
protections of respondent's Fourth Amendment right
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by "first·
requiring a third party b.ank t.Q co_py ,all of its de_posito.rj'
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personal checks and then, with an improper invocation of
legal process, calling upon the bank to allow inspection
and reproduction of those copies." 500 F. 2d, at 757. The
court acknowledged that the recordkeeping requirements
of the Bank Secrecy Act had been held to be constitu..
tiona! on their face in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
416 U. S. 21 (1974), but noted that access to the records
wa.s to be controlled by "existing legal process." See id.,
at 52. The subpoenas issued here were found not to constitute adequate "legal process." The fact that the bank
officers cooperated voluntarily wa.s found to be irrelevant,
for "he whose rights are threatened by the improper disclosure here wa.s a bank depositor, not a bank official."
500 F. 2d, at 758.
The Government contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in three respects: (i) in finding that respondent had
the Fourth Amendment interest necessary to entitle
him to challenge the validity of the subpoena.s duces
tecum through his motion to suppress; (ii) in holding
that the subpoenas were defective; and (iii) in determining that suppression of the evidence obtained was
the appropriate remedy if a constitutional violation did
take place.
We find that there wa.s no intrusion into any area in
which respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment
interest and that the District Court therefore correctly
denied respondent's motion to suppress. Because we·
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on that
·ground alone, we do not reach the Government's latter
·two contentions.

II
In Hoffa v. 'United States, 385 U. S. 293, 301-302'
(1966), the Court said that "no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment" is implicated by gov...
~rnmental investigative Jtctivities .up,Jess there is an in..

1
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trusion into a zone of privacy, into "the security a mart
relies upon when he places himself or his property within
a constitutionally protected area." The Court of Ap•
peals, as noted above, assumed that respondent had the
necessary Fourth Amendment interest, pointing to the
language in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S., at 622,
which describes that Amendment's protection against
the "compulsory production of a man's private papers." 1
We think that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the
subpoenaed documents to fall within a protected zone of
privacy.
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not
respondent's "private papers." Unlike the claimant in
Boyd, respondent can assert neither ownership nor pos·
session. Instead, these are the business records of the
banks. As we said in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultt,
416 U. S., at 48-49, "[b]anks are ... not ... neutrals in
transactions involving negotiable instruments, but parties
to the instruments with a substantial stake in their con·
tinued availability and acceptance." The records of respondent's accounts, like "all of the records [which are
required to be kept pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act,]
pertain to transactions to which the bank was itself a
party." Id., at 52.
Respondent argues, however, that the Bank Secrecy
Act introduces a factor that makes the subpoena in this
case the functional equivalent of a search and seizure of
the depositoes "private papers." We have held, in Cali..
fornia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 54, that the
mere maintenance of records pursuant to the requirements of the Act "invade[s] no Fourth Amendment right
of any depositor/' But respondent contends that the
1

The Fourth Amendment implications of Boyd as it applies to
subpoenas duces tecum have been undercut by more recent cases.
Fisher v. United States,- U. S. - (1976) , slip op., at 15, Boo
.i~fra, a.t. 10,
'
· ·
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combination of the recordkeeping requirements of the
Act and the issuance of a subpoena 2 to obtain those
records permits the Government to circumvent the re•
quirements of the Fourth Amendment by allowing it to
obtain a depositor's private records without complying
with the legal requirements that would be applicable had
it proceeded against him directly. 8 Therefore, we must
address the question whether the compulsion embodied in
the Bank Secrecy Act as exercised in this case creates
a Fourth Amendment interest in the depositor where
none existed before. This question was expressly re·
served in California Bankers Assn., supra, at 53-54 &

n. 24.
Respondent urges that he has a Fourth Amendment
interest in the records kept by the banks because they
are merely copies of personal records that were made
available to the banks for a limited purpose and in
which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. He
relies on this Court's statement in Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 341, 353 (1961), quoting Warden v. Hayden,
387 U. S. 294, 304 ( 1967), that "we have ... departed
from the narrow view" that " 'property interests control
the right of the Government to search and seize,'" and
that a "search and seizure" become unreasonable when
2 Respondent
appears to contend that a depositor's Fourth
,Amendment interest comes into play only when a defective subpoena is used to obtain records kept pursuant to the Act. We see·
no reason why the existence of a Fourth Amendment interest turns
on whether the subpoena is defective. Therefore, we do not limit
our consideration to the situ:ttion in which there is an alleged defect
in the subpoena served on the ·bank.
8 It is not clear whether respondent refers to attempts to obtain
private documents through a subpoena. issued directly to the de.
:positor or through a search pursuant to a warrant. The question
whether personal business records may be seized pursuant to a
valid warrant Js before this Court in No. 74-1646, Andresen v~

Maryland.

74-tl79-0P!NION
UNITED STATES v. MILLER

"'

the Government's activities violate "the privacy upon
which [a person] JUStifiably relie[s]." But in Katz the
Court also stressed that " [ w] hat a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection ." ld., at 351. We must examine the
nature of the particular documents sought to be protected
m order to determine whether there is a legitimate "expectatwn of privacy" concerning their contents. Cf.
Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 335 (1973) .
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks
and deposit slips, rather than to the microfilm copies
actually viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena,.
we perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in
their contents. The checks are not confidential communications but negotiabl-e instruments to be used in
commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained,
including financial statements and deposit slips, contain
only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business. The lack of any legitimate expectation of
privacy concerning the information kept in bank records
was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records;
to be maintained because they "have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations
and proceedings.'' 12 U. S. C. § 1829b .(a)(1) . Cf.
Couch v Untted States, supra, at 335.
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the government. United States v. White,
401 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1971). This Court has held'
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaming of information revealed to a thira
party and conveyed by him to government authorities,
~ve.n if t.he mfor:mat.ion ia, revealed em the assumptioll!l
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that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
!d., at 752; Ho ffa v United States, 385 U. S., at 302;
Lopez v United States, 373 U. S. 427 (1963) .4
This analysis IS not changed by the mandate of the
Bank Secrecy Act that records of depositors' transactions
be maintained by banks. In California Bankers Assn. v.
Shultz, supra, at 52-53, we rejected the contention that
banks, when keeping records of their depositors' trans..
actions pursuant to the Act, are acting solely as agents
of the government. But, even if the banks could be
said to have been actmg solely as government agents in
transcribing the necessary information and complying
without protest 5 with the requirements of the subpoenas,
there would be no intrusion upon the depositors' Fourth
Amendment rights. See Osborn v. United States, 385
U. S. 323 (1966) ; Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206
(1966).

III
Since no Fourth Amendment interests of the depositor
are rmphcated here, this case is governed by the general
rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party
to obtam the records of that party does not violate·
the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution
is contemplated at the time the subpoena is issued.
California BankertJ A.ssn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S., at 53;
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517, 537 (1971)
(Douglas, J, concurring). Under these principles, it
4
We do not address here the question of evidentiary privileges, \
such as that protrctmg commun ications between an attorney and
hiS chent. Cf F1~her y United States, U . S. ( 1976) , slip·
op., at - .
• Nor d1d the banks notify respondent, a neglect without legal
,cons!'quences hf're 1 however unatt_ractive it may be,
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was firmly settled, before the passage of the Bank
Secrecy Act , that an Internal Revenue Service summons
directed to a third-party bank does not violate the
Fourth Amendment rights of a depositor under investigation. See First N ational Bank v. United States, 267 U.S.
576 (1925), aff'g 295 F . 142 (SD Ala. 1924) . See also
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 53; Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S., at 522.
Many banks traditionally kept permanent records of
their depositors' accounts, although not all banks did so
and the practice was declining in recent years. By requiring that such records be kept by all banks, the Bank
Secrecy Act is not a novel means designed to circumvent established Fourth Amendment rights. It is merely
an attempt to facilitate the use of a proper and longstanding law enforcement technique by insuring that
records are available when they are needed. 6
We hold that the District Court correctly denied respondent's motion to suppress, since he possessed no
Fourth Amendment interest that could be vindicated by
a challenge to the subpoenas.
Petitioner d()('S not contend that the subpoenas infringed upon
his First Amendment rights. There was no blanket reporting re.
U. S,
quirement of the sort we addressed in Buckley v. Valeo, (1976), slip op., at 54-76, nor any allegation of an improper
inquiry into protected associational activities of the sort presented
in Eastland v United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491
(1975) .
We are not confronted with a situation in which the Government,
through "unreviewed executive discretion," has made a wide-ranging
inqmry that unnecessanly "touchfes] upon intimate areas of at?.
individual's personal affairs." California Bankers .Assn. v. Shultz,
supra, at 78-79 (PowELL, J., concurring) . Here the Government
has exercised its powers through narrowly directed subpoenas duces
tecum subject to the legal restraints attendant to such proc~.
See Pnrt. IV, infra.
11
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Respondent contends not only that the subpoenas
duces tecum directed against the banks infringed his
Fourth Amendment rights, but that a subpoena issued
to a bank to obtain records maintained pursuant to the
Act is subject to more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the ordinary subpoena. In making
this assertion he relies on our statement in Cali/orni4
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, that access to the records
maintained by banks under the Act is to be controlled
by "existing legal process."
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 208 ( 1946), the Court said that "the Fourth
[AmendmentL if applicable [to subpoenas for the production of business records and papers], at the most
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefinite..
ness or breadth in the things required to be 'particularly
described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding
agency is authorized by taw to make and the materials
-specified are relevant." See also United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1973). Respondent, citing
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S.
297 (1972), m which we discussed the applica.tion of
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to
domestic security surveillance through electronic eavesdropping, suggests that greater judicial scrutiny, equiv..
alent to that required for a search warrant, is neces-.
sary when a subpoena is to be used to obtain bank
records of a depositor's account. But in California
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, we emphasized only that
access to the records was to be in accordance with "exist..
ing legal process.H There was no indication that a new
-rule was to be d~vised, or that the tradjtional distinctiol).
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between a search warrant and a subpoena would not be
recognized. 7
In any event, for the reasons stated above, we hold
that respondent lacks the requisite Fourth Amendment
interest to challenge the validity of the subpoenas. 8

v
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
court deferred decision on whether the trial court had
improperly overruled respondent's motion to suppress
distillery apparatus and raw material seized from a rented
truck. We remand for disposition of thai issue.

So ordered.

1 A subpoena duces tecum issued to obtain records is subject t~
no more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the
ordina.ry subpoena. A search warrant, in contrast, is issuable only
pursuant to prior judicial approval and authorizes government officers to seize evidence without requiring enforcement through the
courts. See United States v. Dionisio, supra, at 9-10.
8 There is no occasion for us to address whether the subpoenas
complied with the requirements outlined in Walling. The bank&
upon which they were served did not contest their validity.
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United States, Petitioner,] On Writ of Certiorari to the
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the·
Court,
Respondent was convicted of possessing an unregis..tered still, carrying on the business of a distiller without
giving bond and with intent to defraud the Government
of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of whiskey upon
which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to defraud
the United States of tax revenues. 26 U. S. C. § 5179,
5205, 5601 et seq.; 18 U. S. C. § 371. Prior to trial
respondent moved to suppress copies of checks and other
bank records obtained by means of allegedly defective
subpoenas duces tecum served upon two banks at which
he had accounts. The records had been maintained by
the banks in compliance with the requirements of the
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U. S. C. § 1829b (d).
The District Court overruled respondent's motion to
suppress and the evidence was admitted. The Court· of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground
that a depositor's Fourth Amendment rights are violated
when bank records maintained pursuant to the Bank
Secrecy Act are obtained by means of a defective sub·poena. It held that any evidence so obtained must be
suppressed. Since we find that respondent had no pro·tectable Fourth Amendment interest in the subpoenaeq
,documents, we reverse the decision below.
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I
On December 18, 1972, in response to an informant;s
tip, a deputy sheriff from Houston County, Ga., stopped
a van-type truck occupied by two of respondent's alleged
co-conspirators. The truck contained distillery appa...
ratus and raw material. On January 9, 1973, a fire broke
out in a Kathleen, Ga., warehouse rented to respondent.
During the blaze firemen and sheriff department officials
discovered a 7,500 gallon-capacity distillery, 175 gallons
·of nontax-paid whiskey, and related paraphernalia.
Two weeks later agents from the Treasury Department's Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Unit presented
grand jury subpoenas issued in blank by the clerk of the
District Court, and completed by the United States
Attorney's office, to the presidents of the Citizens &
Southern National Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank
·Of Byron, where respondent maintained accounts. The
subpoenas required the two presidents to appear on
January 24, 1973, and to produce.
"all records of accounts, i. e,, savings, checking,
loan or otherwise, in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller
[respondent], 3859 Mathis Street, Macon, Ga.
and/or Mitch Miller Associates, 100 Executive
Terrace, Warner Robins, Ga., from October 1, 197·2,
through the present date [.fanuary 22, 1978, in the
case of the Bank of Byron, and January 23, 1973,
in the case of the Citizens & Southern National Bank
of Warner Robins] ."'
The banks did not advise respondent that the subpoenas
had been served but ordered their employees to make the
records available and to provide copies of any documents
the agents desired. At the Bank of Byron, an agent was
shown microfilm records of the relevant account and proy~ded with copies of one deposit slip ~nfl one 9r ~WOJ~hecks.
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At the Citizens & Southern National Bank microfilm records also were shown to the agent, and he was given copies
of the records of respondent's account during the applicable period. These included all checks, deposit slips, two
financial statements and three monthly statements. The
bank presidents were then told that it would not be
necessary to appear in person before the grand jury.
The grand juty met on Februaty 12, 1973, 19 days
after the return date on the subpoenas. Respondent and
four others wete indicted. The overt acts alieged to
have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy
ihcluded three financial transactions-the rentai by reSpondent of the van-type truck, the purchase by respondent of radio equipment, and the purchase by respondent
o{ a quantity of sheet metal and metal pipe. The record
does not indicate whether any of the bank records were
in fact presented to the grand jury. They were used in
the investigation and provided "one or two" investiga•
tory leads. Copies of the checks also were introduced
at triai to establish the overt acts described above.
In his motion to suppress, denied by the District Court,
respondent contended that the bank documents were iliegaliy seized. It was urged that the subpoenas were
defective because they were issued by the U.S. Attorney
rather than a court, no return was made to a court, and
the subpoenas were returnable on a date when the grand
jury was not in session. The Court of Appeals reversed.
500 F . 2d 751 (1974). Citing the prohibition in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 622 (1886), against "compulsory production of a man's private papers to estabiish a criminal charge against him," the court held that
the government had improperiy circumvented Boyd's
protections of respondent's Fourth Amendment right
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by "first
requiring a third party bank to copy all of its· de~osit~)
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personal checks and then, with an improper invocation of
legal process, calling upon the bank to allow inspection
and reproduction of those copies." 500 F. 2d, at 757. The
court acknowledged that the recordkeeping requirements
of the Bank Secrecy Act had been held to be constitutional on their face in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
416 U. S. 21 (1974), but noted that access to the records
wa.s to be controlled by "existing legal process." See id.,
a.t 52. The subpoenas issued here were found not to constitute adequate "legal process." The fact that the bank
officers cooperated voluntarily was found to be irrelevant,
for "he whose rights are threatened by the improper disclosure here was a bank depositor, not a bank official."
500 F . 2d, at 758.
The Government contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in three respects : (i) in finding that respondent had
the Fourth Amendment interest necessary to entitle
him to challenge the validity of the subpoenas duces
tecum through his motion to suppress; (ii) in holding
that the subpoenas were defective; and (iii) in determining that suppression of the evidence obtained was.
the appropriate remedy if a constitutional violation did
take place.
We find that there was no intrusion into any area in
which respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment
interest and that the District Court therefore correctly
denied respondent's motion to suppress. Because we
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on that
ground alone, we do not reach the Government's latter
two contentions.

II
In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 301-302:
(1966), the Court said that "no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment" is implicated by gov-·
ernmental investigative activities unless there ia an in.-
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trusion into a zone of privacy, into "the security a marl
relies upon when he places himself or his property within
a constitutionally protected area." The Court of Appeals, as noted above, assumed that respondent had the
necessary Fourth Amendment interest, pointing to the
language in Boyd v. Unif!ed States, 116 U. S., at 622,
which describes that Amendmen't's protection 'against
the "compulsory production of a man's priva~ papers." 1
We think that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the
subpoenaed documents to fait within a protected zone of
privacy.
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not
respondent's 11 private papers." UnHke the claimant in
Boyd, respondent can assert neither ownership nor pos..
session. Instead, these are the business 'i'ecords of the
banks. As we said in Ca.lifornia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
416 U. S., at 48-49, 11 [b] ariks are ... not ... neutra1s in
transactions involving negotiable instruments, hit parties
to the instruments with a substantial stake in their continued availability and acceptance." 'The records of respondent's accotnits, ·like "a:il of the records [which are
required to be kept pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act,]
pertain to transactions to which the bank was itself a
party." Id., at 52.
Respondent argues, however, that the Bank Secrecy
Act introduces a factor that makes the subpoena in this
case the functional equivalent of a search and seizure of
the depositoes "private papers." We have held, in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 54, that the
mere maintenance of records pursuant to the requirements of the Act "invade[s] no Fourth Amendment right
of any depositor." But respondent contends that the
1 The Fourth Amendment implications of Boyd as it applies to
subpoenas duces tecum have been undercut by more recent cases.
Fisher v. United States,- U.S,- (1976), slip op., a.t 15,
i &iJro:1 ~,t 10.
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combination of the recordkeeping requirements of the
Act and the issuance of a subpoena 2 to obtain those
records permits the Government to circumvent the re..
quirements of the Fourth Amendment by allowing it to
obtain a depositor's private records without complying
with the legal requirements that would be applicable had
it proceeded against him directly. 8 Therefore, we must
address the question whether the compulsion embodied in
the Bank Secrecy Act as exercised in this case creates
a Fourth Amendment interest in the depositor where
none existed before. This question was expressly re . .
served in California Bankers Assn., supra, at 53-54 &
n. 24.
Respondent urges that he has a Fourth Amendment
interest in the records kept by the banks because they
are merely copies of personal records that were made
available to the banks for a limited purpose and in
which he has a reasonable ru!pectation of privacy. He
relies on this Court's statement in Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 34'1, 853 (1~61) , quoting Warden v. Hayden,
387 U. S. 294, 304 (1967) , that "we have ... departed
from the narrow view" that " 'property inteFests control
the right of the Government to search and seize,'" and
that a "search and seizure" become unreasonable when
Respondent appea.rs to contend that a depositor's Fourth
Amendment interest comes into play only when a defectiv e subpoena is used to obtain records kept pursuant to the Act. We see·
no reason why the existence of a Fourth Amendment interest turns:
.on whether the subpoena is defective. Therefore, we do not limit
our consideration to the situ!ttion in which there is an alleged defect
·in the subpoena served on the bank.
8 It is not clear whether respondent refers to attempts to obtain
private documents through a subpoena issued directly to the de-·
positor or through a search pursuant to a warrant. The question
whether personal business records may be seized pursuant to a
valid warrant is before this Court in No. 74-1646, Anljresen y.
Mq.rulan¢.
1
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the Government's activities violate "the privacy upon
which [a person] justifiably relie[s].'' But in Katz the
Court also stressed that " [ w] hat a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amend·
ment protection." !d., at 351. We must examine the
nature of the particular documents sought to be protected
in order to determine whether there is a legitimate "expectation of privacy" concerning their contents. Cf.
Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 335 (1973).
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks
and deposit slips, rather than to the microfiim copies
actually viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena,
we perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in
their contents. The checks are not confidential com·
munications but ,negotiable instruments to be Used in
commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained,
including financial statements and deposit slips, contain
only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business. The lack of any legitimate expectation of
privacy concerning the information kept in bank records
was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records
to be maintained because they "have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations
and proceedings." 12 U. S. C. § 1829b (a) (1). Cf.
Couch v. United States, supra, at 335.
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the government. United States v. White,
401 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1971). This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumptio:q:
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that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
ld., at 752; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S., at 302;
Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427 (1963).4
This analysis is not changed by the mandate of the
Bank Secrecy Act that records of depositors' transactions
be maintained by banks. In California Bankers Assn. V;
Shultz, supra, at 52-53, we rejected the contention that
banks, when keeping records of their depositors' transactions pursuant to the Act, are acting solely as agents·
of the government. But, even if the banks could be
said to have been acting solely as government agents in
·transcribing the necessary information and complying·
without protest 5 with the requirements of the subpoenas,
·there would be no intrusion upon the . depositors' ·Fourth
Amendment rights. See Dsborn v. United States, 385
U. S. 323 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. ~06
I (1966),

III
Since no Fourth Amendment inter~sts of the depositor
· ~e implicated here, this case is governed by the general
rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party
' to obtain the records of that party rloes not violate·
·the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution
is contemplate4 at the time the subpoena is issued.
'California 8anl.cers Assn. · v. Shultz, 4:16 U. S., at 53;·
Donaldson v. United · States, 400 U.-S. 51:-7, 537 (1971)
(Douglas, J ., concurring). Under these principles, it
4

We do not address here the question of evidentiary privileges,
such a.s that protecting communications between an attorney and·
· his client. Cf; Fisher, v. United States, U. S. (1976), slip
' op., at - .
.o; Nor did the banks notify respondent , a. neglect witho1;1t l~~at
• ,~onse~~ences here, however unattractive_ 1t ma.Y ,9e.
·
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was firmly settled, before the passage of the Bank
's ecrecy Act, that an Internal Revenue Service summons
directed to a third-party bank does not violate the
Fourth Amendment rights of a depositor under investigation. See First National Bank v. United States, 267 U.S.
576 (1925), 'aff'g 295 F. 142 (SD Ala. 1924). See 'also
California Bqnkers Assn. v. Shultz, suy_ra, at 53; Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S., at 522.
.
Many banks traditionally kept permanent records of
'their depositors' accounts, although not all bau"ks did so
and the practice was declining in recent years. By requiring that such records be kept by all banks, the Bank
Secrecy Act is not a novel means designed to circumvent established Fourth Amendment rights. It is _merely
an attempt to facilitate the use . of a proper and longstanding law enforcement technique by ipsuring that
records are available when they are needed. 6
We hold that the District Court correctly denied respondent's motion to suppress, sine~ he possessed no
Fourth Amendment interest that could be vindicated by
a challenge to the subpoenas.
6 Petitioner does not contend that the subpoenas infringed upon
his First Amendment rights. There was no blanket reporting requirement of the sort we addressed in · Buckley v. Valeo, U. S.
(1976) , slip op., at 54-76, nor any allegation of an improper
inquiry into protected associational activities of the sort presented
in Eastland v. Unit ed States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491
(1975) .
We are not confronted with a situation in which the Government,
through "unreviewed executive discretion," has made a wide-ranging
inquiry that unneoossarily "touchfes] upon intimate areas of an
individual's personal affairs." California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
supra, at 78-79 (PowELL, J ., concurring) . Hete the Government
has exercised its powers through narrowly directed subpoenas duces
tecum subject to the legal restraints attendant to such .procees.
·see ·Part IV, infra .

•J
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IV
Respondent contends not only that the subpoenaS
duces tecum directed against the banks infringed his
Fourth Amendment rights, but that a subpoena issued
to a bank to obtain records maintained pursuant to the
Act is subject to more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the ordinary subpoena. In making
this assertion he relies on our statement in California
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, that access to the records
maintained by banks under the Act is to be controlled
by "existing legal process." 7
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 208 ( 19-'6), the Court said that "the Fourth
[Amendment], if applicable [to subpoenas for the production of b\}siness records and papers], at the most
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in tlie things required to be 'particularly
described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding
agency is authorized by law to make and the materials
specified are relevant." See also United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 11-12 ( 1973). Respondent, citing
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S.
297 ( 1972), in which we discussed the application of
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to
domestic security surveillance through electronic eavesdropping, suggests that greater judicial scrutiny, equiv7 This case differs from Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d
238,529 P. 2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974), relied on by MR. JusTICE BRENNAN in dissent, in that the bank records of respondent's
accounts were furnished in response to "compulsion by legal process"
in the form of subpoenas duces tecum. The court in Burrows found
it "significant .. . that the bank [in that case] provided the state-.
ments to the police in response to an informal oral request for
information." 13 Cal. 3d, at 243, 529 P. 2d, at 593, 118 Cal. :R,Ptr~·
.at 169~
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alent to that required for a search warrant, is necessary when a. subpoena is to be used to obtain bank
records of a depositor's account. But in California
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, we emphasized only that
access to the records was to be in accordance with "existing legal process." There was no indication that a new
rule was to be devised, or that the traditional distinction
between a search warrant and a subpoena would not be
recognized. 8
In any event, for the reasons stated above, we hold
that respondent lacks the requisite Fourth Amendment
interest to challenge the validity of the subpoenas.11

v
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
court deferred decision on whether the trial court had
1'mproperly overruled respondent's motion to suppress·
distillery apparatus and raw materia1 seized from a rented
truck. We remand for disposition ·of that issue.
So

ordered~

A subpoena duces tecum issued to obtain records is subject tOJ
·no more· stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the·
ordinary sublJOOna. A search warrant, in contrast, is issuable only
· pursuant to prior judicial approval and authorizes government officers to seize evidence without requiring enforcement through the
courts. See · United' States v. Dionisio, supra, at 9-10.
9 There is no occasion for us to address whether the subpoenas
complied with the requirements outlined in Walling . The banbl
:' lllp<>n: whfuh they were served did not contest tlJ,eir validity.
8
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Certiorari to U.S. Court of Appeals for 5th Circuit.
(M

H<WA.

Respondent was convicted for possessing ,175 gallons
1\,

of whiskey upon which no taMes had

~

paid /')..C..O

Prior to his trial, he moved to suppress copies of
his checks, deposit slips/ and other bank
to be incriminating.

record~ /deemed

These records had been obtained by

subpoenas duces tecum/ served upon two banks in which
respondent had accounts.

The banks maintained

records in accordance with the

requirement~£

~

these

the Bank

Secrecy Act of 1970.
The District Court declined to suppress the records,
but the Court of Appeals

~eversed.

It concluded that the

records had been obtained by defective subpoenas, thereby
violating respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.
We take a different view.
were not respondent's
busine ~s

~

The records subpoenaed

rivate papers.

·----

records of the banks'.

Rather, they were

Even with respect to the

original checks and deposit slipsJ'copied by the banks,
respondent - having made these available to a third party,;!
th~k

- could have had no legitimate expectation of

privacy in their contents.

The depositor takes the risk,

~~~U<-1~
k

...~...../.:.,_, ~

~~

2.
in revealing his affairs to another;{n the course of
his commercial transactions,j that the information will
be conveyed to the government.

-

We conclude, therefore, that there was no intrusion
upon protected Fourth Amendment interests of respondent ~
and that the District Court correctly denied respondent's
motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision

of the Court of Appeals.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall have
filed dissenting opinions.
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Respondeat was convicted for possessing

175 gallons

of whiskey upon which no taxes had been paid .
Prior to his trial, be moved to suppress copies of
bia checks, deposit slips and other bank recorda deemed

to be incr iminatiag.

These recorda had been obtained by

subpoenas duces tecum served upon two banks in which
respondent had accounts.

The banks maintained that these

records in accordance with the requirements of the Bank
Seer cy Act >of l970.
The District Court declined to suppress the records,

but tbe Court of Appeals reversed.

It concluded that the

records had been obtained by defective subpo nas, thereby
violating respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.
e take a different view.

The records subpoenaed

were not respondent's private papers.
business records of th banks • .

Rather, they were

:t.ven with respect to the

original checks and deposit slips copied by the banks,
respondent - having

de these available to a third party,

the bank - could bave had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in their contents.

The

depositor takes the risk.,

2.

in revealing his affairs to another in the course of
his cOIIB.Dercial transactions, that the information will
be conveyed to the government.
We conclude, therefore, that there was no intrusion
upon protected Fourth Amendment interests of respondent,
and that the District Court correctly denied respondent's
motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision

of the Court of Appeals.
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall have
filed dissenting opinions.
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April 29, 1976

Case held for No. 74-1179 U.S. v. Miller
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
No. 75-5425 Riddick v. United States
The only question in this case is that addressed by the
Court in Miller: Whether a defendant can challenge the
admission into evidence at trial of bank records subpoenaed
from a bank handling his financial transactions. In this
case, unlike Miller, the subpoenas were concededly in
compliance with Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. But, as we said in Miller (note 2):
"We see no reason why the existence of a
Fourth Amendment interest turns on whether
the subpoena is defective. Therefore, we do
not limit our consideration to the situation
in which there is an alleged defect in the
subpoena served on the bank."

CAB refused to allow petitioner to challenge the introduction
of the subpoenaed evidence. I will vote to Deny certiorari.

L.F.P., Jr.
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